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Managing Complex Litigation in the Illinois Courts
Mark C. Weber*

I.

INTRODUCTION

For more than a generation, the "big case" has been a leading issue
in civil procedure.' Big cases-complex litigation-stem from the
complexity of modem life. For example, mass production of goods
causes mass torts, numerous but widely dispersed injuries from the
same defective products.2 Air crashes and building collapses are mass
disasters, and lead to mass disaster litigation.3 Frequently, the only
alternative to the big case is hundreds or thousands of duplicative individual cases. The sheer number of cases can paralyze the court sys-

* Professor of Law and Acting Dean, DePaul University College of Law; B.A., 1975,
Columbia University; J.D., 1978, Yale Law School. Portions of this paper are based on
research for the Illinois Manualfor Complex Litigation, drafted by. the Illinois Judicial
Conference Committee on Complex Litigation (revised edition, 1994), and on ideas
developed at the Illinois Judicial Conference Regional Seminar on Complex Litigation,
held in 1995. The author wishes to thank the contributors to the Manual and the
Conference. Thanks also to Kristin Donnelly Miller, DePaul College of Law Class of
1997, for her research assistance.
1. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., PROCEDURE IN ANTITRUST AND OTHER
PROTRACTED CASES, 13 F.R.D. 41 (1951) (describing the problem of presiding over
complex cases).
2. The paradigmatic cases are asbestos and medical devices with toxic side-effects.
E.g., In re N. Dist., Dalkon Shield IUD Prods., 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983); In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig., 771 F. Supp. 415
(J.P.M.L. 1991); see, e.g., Francis E. McGovern, An Analysis of Mass Torts for Judges,
73 TEx. L. REV. 1821, 1825-26 (1995) (categorizing mass torts); Francis E. McGovern,
Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. REV. 659 (1989) [hereinafter
McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation] (discussing asbestos and other mass
torts in which verdicts have been rendered in favor of a number of plaintiffs).
3. See, e.g., In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.) (litigation involving the collapse of two hotel skywalks that killed and injured hundreds), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1982); Causey v. Pan Am. World Airways, 66 F.R.D. 392 (E.D.
Va. 1975) (suit involving the deaths of two passengers on a Pan Am aircraft that
crashed). Definitions of complex civil litigation typically include dispersed product
injuries and large single-incident disaster cases; frequently they include environmental
contaminations as well. See, e.g., 3 HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS
§ 17.06 (2d ed. 1985). See generally Jay Tidmarsh, Unattainable Justice: The Form of
Complex Litigation and the Limits of Judicial Power, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1683,
1692-1734 (1992) (discussing definitions of complex litigation).
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tem with identical sets of litigants, attorneys, and judges disputing and
resolving identical or nearly identical factual and legal issues.4
Many authorities have suggested that the judicial system should respond to mass injury and large-scale disaster litigation by consolidating all potential cases and transferring them to federal magnet forums.5
Taking this step would be ill-advised.6 Transfer and consolidation
carry important advantages of judicial economy and consistency in
resolution of disputes,7 but consolidation into the federal courts would
4. Note, Class Certification in Mass Accident Cases Under Rule 23(b)(1), 96 HARV.
L. REV. 1143, 1144 (1983). Of course, duplicative effort on a large number of individual
cases is not the sole alternative. Exercising its power to regulate interstate commerce,
Congress could create administrative relief schemes, as it has for workers' accidental injuries and for coal miners' black lung disease, perhaps spreading the cost of injury over
an entire industry or the taxpaying public. Under the same authority, Congress could
abolish product liability or other causes of action, leaving the cost of the harm on the
victims. The judiciary, however, particularly that portion of it operating at the trial
level, can efficiently administer the existing law of torts in mass injury situations only
by manipulating the configuration of the lawsuits and by adopting managerial initiatives.
5.

AMERICAN BAR Ass'N COMM'N ON MASS TORTS, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT CH. 5 (PROPOSED

(Nov. 1989);

FINAL DRAFT 1993); John C. McCoid, A Single Package for Multiparty Disputes, 28

STAN. L. REV. 707 (1976) (discussing the merits of consolidating similar actions before
the same federal court); Thomas D. Rowe & Kenneth D. Sibley, Beyond Diversity:
Federal Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 7, 14-22 (1986); see
Allen R. Kamp, The Shrinking Forum: The Supreme Court's Limitation of JurisdictionAn Argument for a Federal Forum in Multi-Party, Multi-State Litigation, 21 WM.&
MARY L. REV. 161 (1979) (supporting statutory provisions for consolidation of multistate cases in the federal courts). Some skeptical voices have criticized these views.
Richard A. Epstein, The Consolidation of Complex Litigation: A Critical Evaluation of
the AL! Proposal, 10 J.L. & CoM. 1 (1990) (criticizing consolidated proceedings);
Roger H. Trangsrud, Mass Trials in Mass Tort Cases: A Dissent, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 69
(criticizing some aspects of consolidated proceedings). A number of proposals call for
use of federal class action procedures in mass tort cases, a form of consolidation in the
federal district courts that would presumably displace state court individual proceedings.
Bruce H. Nielson, Note, Was the 1966 Advisory Committee Right?: Suggested
Revisions of Rule 23 to Allow More Frequent Use of Class Actions in Mass Tort
Litigation, 25 HARV. J. ON LEGiS. 461 (1988); Patricia Zimand, Note, National Asbestos
Litigation: Procedural Problems Must Be Solved, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 899 (1991).
Additional sources proposing expansion of the federal class action rules include Note,
Class Certification in Mass Accident Cases Under Rule 23(b)(1), 96 HARV. L. REV. 1143
(1983); Briggs L. Tobin, Comment, The "Limited Generosity" Class Action and a
Uniform Choice of Law Rule: An Approach to Fair and Effective Mass-Tort Punitive
Damage Adjudication in the Federal Courts, 38 EMORY L.J. 457 (1989); Federal
bankruptcy procedures have also been suggested as a means to resolve mass torts cases.
Note, The Manville Bankruptcy: Treating Mass Tort Claims in Chapter 11 Proceedings,
96 HARV. L. REV. 1121 (1983).
6. Mark C. Weber, Complex Litigation and the State Courts: Constitutional and
PracticalAdvantages of the State Forum Over the FederalForum in Mass Tort Cases, 21
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 215 (1994).
7. See, e.g., United Mine Workers v.Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966) (noting
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distort the proper mission of those tribunals and involve them in the
development of state tort law, a task the federal courts are poorly
equipped to carry out.8
The preferred course should be the transfer and consolidation of
complex civil litigation into the state courts. 9 For the alternative of
state adjudication of complex litigation to succeed, however, state
courts need to resolve the practical and doctrinal problems involved in
deciding the big cases.'° Large-scale litigation has created suits that
preoccupy the court system for decades, trials that take years to complete, and records that fill warehouses." Only by solving the management problems of complex litigation can state courts become a

workable alternative to the federal forum. 12
This Article addresses the issues involved in litigating complex
cases in the courts of our sixth largest state, Illinois. This Article begins with an account of the rise of complex civil litigation in the Illinois
courts.' 3 It next details the efforts of the organized Illinois judiciary

benefits of consolidation of disputes into a single litigation); Michael J. Saks & Peter
D. Blanck, Justice Improved: The Unrecognized Benefits of Aggregation and Sampling
in the Trial of Mass Torts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 815, 826-39 (1992).
8. Weber, supra note 6, at 225-30 (contending that for reasons of majoritarianism
and federalism, federal courts should not be involved in the construction of state tort law
that would be required if they heard consolidated mass tort cases; also contending that
creating a federal law of mass tort would violate federalism principles, and that federal
courts would better allocate their scarce time on federal statutory and civil rights cases
than on mass tort cases). For a detailed response to many of the positions taken in that
article, see Linda S. Mullenix, Mass Tort Litigation and the Dilemma of Federalization,
44 DEPAUL L. REV. 755 (1995); see also LINDA S. MULLENIX, MASS TORT LITIGATION:
CASES AND MATERIALS 439-77, 1126-48 (1995) (discussing choice of state or federal
forum and issues of cooperative federalism in mass tort litigation).
9. Weber, supra note 6, at 218.
10. The practical problems include the differences in state court practice rules, the potential for judicial corruption, and the perceived incompetence of some state court
judges. The doctrinal hurdles to be overcome include due process concerns, application
of forum non conveniens and venue rules, choice of law considerations, and other interstate conflicts.
11. See, e.g., William W. Schwarzer et al., Judicial Federalism:A Proposal to Amend
the Multidistrict Litigation Statute to Permit Discovery Coordination of Large-Scale
Litigation Pending in State and Federal Courts, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1529, 1529-30 (1995)
(noting some of the court delays and judicial frustration caused by complex litigation);
see also McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, supra note 2 (analyzing
two major mass tort cases from the case management perspective).
12. States other than Illinois have made efforts to solve these problems by court rules
and suggested judicial practices. See Cal. Sup. Ct. Rules: Recommended Standards of
Judicial Admin. § 19 (1991) (providing special procedures for complex litigation); E.
HENNESSEY ET AL., COMPLEX AND PROTRACTED CASES IN STATE COURTS:

READINGS

PREPARED FOR THE CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES (1981) (materials prepared by Supreme

Judicial Court of Massachusetts and National Center for State Courts).
13. See infra part II.
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and individual judges to develop systems and doctrines that facilitate
the litigation of complex civil cases, particularly mass tort cases. 14 It
also describes some of the solutions that Illinois judges have created
for the problems that the cases present. 5 Next, this Article recommends approaches to facilitate the management of complex cases in
Illinois courts. 6 Specifically, it discusses the virtues of case management 17 and suggests methods of case management for early organization, discovery, settlement, and trial.' 8 This Article then comments on
a number of the emerging issues that the Illinois courts must resolve in
order to handle
complex civil litigation in a more efficient and just
9
manner.'

II.

COMPLEX LITIGATION IN THE ILLINOIS COURTS

Illinois has been the forum for a great deal of comlex litigation, and
it is likely to continue to have this role in the future. Illinois was one
of the first states to adjudicate a class action in which many members
of the plaintiff class did not reside in the state. 2' Illinois state courts
have conducted consolidated discovery and trial proceedings in cases
resulting from contaminated milk distributed by a grocery chain 22 and
from a disastrous chemical spill.23 More recently, a mass trial of injuries attributed to a "sick building" took place in the suburbs of
Chicago. 24 Large-scale consolidated proceedings in asbestos cases are
taking place in a number of Illinois venues.25
14. See infra part Ill.
15. See infra part III.
16. See infra part IV.
17. See infra part IV.A.
18. See infra part IV.B.
19. See infra part V.
20. See, e.g., Kemner v. Monsanto Co., 492 N.E.2d 1327 (I11. 1986); Miner v.
Gillette Co., 428 N.E.2d 478 (Ill. 1981), cert. dismissed, 459 U.S. 86 (1982); In re

Salmonella Litig., 556 N.E.2d 593 (III. App. 1st Dist. 1990).
21. Miner, 428 N.E.2d 478, 485 (holding that the plaintiff could continue to adjudicate his claim on behalf of a nationwide class of persons and could adequately represent
those parties who were not Illinois residents).
22. In re Salmonella Litig., 556 N.E.2d 593 (111. App. 1st Dist. 1990) (involving a

consolidated class action by plaintiffs seeking damages due to salmonellosis poisoning
traced to milk produced by the defendant grocery chain).
23. Kemner, 492 N.E.2d at 1327 (involving 22 consolidated actions to recover for
injuries and property damage allegedly caused by exposure to chemicals released as a
result of a railroad car derailment).
24. Bostick v. Helmuth, Obata & Kassabaum, Inc., No. 92 L 1695 (II1.Cir. Ct. Lake
County, Discovery Order, May 25, 1993).
25. See, e.g., Alexander v. Anchor Packing Co., No. 91 L 554 (I11.Cir. Ct. Peoria
County, Order Setting Cause on Active Calendar, Nov. 19, 1992); In re All Asbestos
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Many factors draw complex cases to the state courts of Illinois. One
is the presence of sophisticated plaintiffs' personal injury firms in the
major urban areas of the state. All things being equal, lawyers tend to
file suit in the jurisdiction in which they feel most comfortable.26 A
second factor is Illinois' liberal long-arm statute. Even when the
events that led to the suit have a tenuous connection with Illinois, the
presence of large-scale industrial and commercial enterprises in the
state minimizes the difficulties of personal jurisdiction in cases against
those potential defendants. Third, certain regions of Illinois award
some of the highest jury verdicts of any location in the country, and
fairly loose intrastate venue rules make it likely that plaintiffs' choices
for locating suits in those areas will be honored.29
While recent Illinois tort reform legislation-the Civil Justice Reform Amendments 30 -may create disincentives to sue in Illinois, the
State will continue to attract complex cases. Other states will not necessarily be better choices of forum for plaintiffs, for any jurisdiction
whose choice of law rules point to the application of Illinois law could
apply the statute. 3' Moreover, applying Illinois' choice of law rules,32
Illinois courts might well ignore the tort reform legislation and apply
the law of other states to multistate controversies before them. 33 AcLitig., [Unnumbered] (II1. Cir. Ct. Madison County, Order, May 12, 1988); In re
Asbestos Litig., Master File No. I (I1l. Cir. Ct. Cook County, Consolidated Case
Management Order No. 1, Sept. 3, 1985).
26. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 143 (1985)
(discussing choice of federal or state court in concurrent jurisdiction cases).
27. See ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 735, § 5/2-209(c) (West 1992). The long-arm
provision states that "[a] court may also exercise jurisdiction on any other basis now or
hereafter permitted by the Illinois Constitution and the Constitution of the United
States." Id.
28. If a defendant has continuous and systematic contacts with a state, jurisdiction
may be proper even though the incident giving rise to suit had nothing to do with the
state. E.g., Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445-49 (1952).
29. See ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 735, § 5/2-1001.5 (West Supp. 1996) (setting
forth procedures whereby a court will grant a change of venue if the court determines that
any party may not receive a fair trial in the court in which the action is pending).
30. Civil Justice Reform Amendments of 1995, Pub. Act No. 89-7, 1995 II1. Legis.
Serv. 224-52 (West) (codified in scattered section of ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. chs. 430,
730, 735, 740, 745, 815, 820).
3 1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS (1971).

32. In choice of law problems, Illinois courts apply the "most significant contact"
test, a form of interest analysis based on the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws.
Ingersoll v. Klein, 262 N.E.2d 593, 596 (111. 1970); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICTS OF LAWS (1971) (discussing of the principles underlying choice of law
problems).
33. Unfair or arbitrary application of the forum state's law violates the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 814-23 (1985).
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cordingly, despite the statute, it is likely that complex cases will continue to flow into Illinois.
III. THE RESPONSE OF THE ILLINOIS COURTS TO
COMPLEX LITIGATION

The organized judiciary of Illinois has formulated a response to the
challenges that complex litigation present. As a first step, the Illinois
Supreme Court formed the Study Committee on Protracted Litigation a4
to recommend solutions to the problem of long, complicated civil
cases. Established by the Illinois Judicial Conference in the late 1980s
and placed under the chairmanship of Judge Philip J. Rarick, this
committee asked what organized reaction the federal courts had made
to the emergence of complex federal litigation in the 1940s and 1950s.
The primary federal activity was a series of conferences that produced
a manual of suggested practices for trial court judges. 3' The Illinois
Committee undertook to create a comparable manual for use by Illinois
courts.
After lengthy committee consideration, the Illinois Manual for
Complex Litigation appeared in late 199 1. The first of its kind in the
United States, it provides practical guidance to trial judges in handling
all types of complex civil litigation, with special sections on mass tort
cases, cases with parallel proceedings in other states, parallel federal
proceedings, and parallel criminal proceedings.36 After completion of
the Manual, the Supreme Court authorized its printing and distribution
to the chief judges of all Illinois circuits. The chief judges and the
Administrative Office of the Illinois Courts have provided copies to all
judges who requested the Manual and other judges who might benefit
from having the Manual available.

34. By 1991, the Supreme Court had renamed the Committee the "Study Committee
on Complex Litigation," apparently fearing that having a committee on protracted
litigation sent the wrong message.
35. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (3d ed. 1995) [hereinafter FEDERAL MANUAL
3D]; MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (2d ed. 1985) [hereinafter FEDERAL MANUAL 2D];
UNITED STATES JUDICIAL CONFERENCE,

MANUAL FOR COMPLEX

LITIGATION

AND

MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION (1970); United States Judicial Conference, Book of
Recommended Procedures for the Trial of Protracted Cases, 25 F.R.D. 351 (1960);
Proceedings of the Seminar on Protracted Cases for United States Judges, 23 F.R.D. 319
(1958); Proceedings of the Seminar on Protracted Cases for United States Circuit and
District Judges, 21 F.R.D. 395 (1957).
36. ILLINOIS JUDICIAL CONFERENCE STUDY COMMITTEE ON COMPLEX LITIGATION, ILLINOIS

1994) [hereinafter ILLINOIS MANUAL]. The
author of this Article has served as Reporter to the Committee on the Manual project during the completion of the Manual and its revision.
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (Rev. ed.
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In 1994, the committee revised the Manual to take account of several
case law developments and statutory changes." Another revision of
the Manual is now underway, occasioned by the recent Illinois tort reform law38 and the Supreme Court's revision of the civil discovery
rules. 39 The Committee is also working on an Illinois manual for
complex criminal cases. The Committee continues to solicit ideas from
judges throughout the state for inclusion in the criminal case manual
and in further revisions of the civil manual.
The Study Committee on Complex Litigation also proposed a number of changes in Illinois Supreme Court rules. The change of greatest
significance, Rule 384, was adopted in 1990.40 The Rule permits consolidation of "civil actions involving one or more common questions
of fact or law [when the civil actions] are pending in different judicial
circuits.,,4 ' According to the Rule, the Supreme Court should approve
consolidation when it "serve[s] the convenience of the parties and...
promote[s] the just and efficient conduct of such actions. 4 The
Supreme Court may act on its own motion or that of any party; the order of transfer and consolidation may include pretrial, trial, or posttrial proceedings.43 The Rule provides a mechanism for the court or
litigants to take the initiative in securing the cost and fairness advantage
of simplified, consolidated proceedings before a single Illinois court.4
In 1995, the Illinois Judicial Conference built on the efforts of the
Study Committee by convening another committee to present a regional seminar on complex litigation for Illinois judges as part of the
ongoing educational efforts sponsored by the Supreme Court. This
37. See ILLINOIS MANUAL, supra note 36. Judges with ideas for management of complex cases in the Illinois courts are encouraged to contact the author at DePaul University College of Law in Chicago, or to contact the Administrative Office of the Illinois
Courts' liaison to the Study Committee on Complex Litigation.
38. Civil Justice Reform Amendments of 1995, Pub. Act No. 89-7, 1995 I1l. Legis.
Serv. 224-52 (West) (codified in scattered sections of ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. chs. 430,
730, 735, 740, 745, 815, 820).
39. ILL. Sup. CT. R. 201-04, 206-07, 213-15, 218-19, 222, 237, as amended at Order
95-18, 1995 I11.Legis. Serv. I11.R-2-44 (West).
40. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 384 (formerly codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 10A, para. 384

(1991)).
4 1. Id. at 384(a).
42. Id.
43. Id. The Supreme Court had previously accomplished the same goal by entering
supervisory orders on an ad hoc basis.
44. The Committee has made a number of other rule proposals, including one to allow
for the designation of cases as complex, another permitting the court to compel parties
to have individuals with settlement authority attend pretrial conferences, and a third to
permit the expanded use of evidence depositions of experts. These proposals remain
pending at the current time.
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program, held in Arlington Heights from September 28 to 30, 1995,
presented a hypothetical scenario of a mass accident and followed the
litigation from the precipitating event to the final disposition, taking up
procedural and management choices faced by the trial judge at every
step of the case.
IV. RECOMMENDED APPROACHES TO COMPLEX CASES IN

ILLINOIS COURTS
The Study Committee on Complex Litigation and the Regional
Seminar Committee both suggested an approach to complex litigation
that may be summarized as one of affirmative case management.
Rather than letting the case develop on its own, the case should be directed so that costs and delays are kept to a minimum and the litigation
is shaped into a form capable of resolution.
Under the approach recommended by the committees, Illinois
judges do not have to modify case law doctrines or press for the adoption of revolutionary statutes or court rules. Management is much
more a matter of attitude and sound practice, a science more practical
than doctrinal.45 Courts, however, must recognize the value of case
management, and then adopt specific techniques for dealing with case
assignment, pretrial conferences and orders, discovery, settlement,
and trial.
A. The Virtues of Case Management
The Illinois Courts have come to recognize the virtues of case management in complex litigation. 46 In the absence of affirmative judicial
management, cases that arise from mass disasters or dispersed product
injuries are characterized by an absence of definition of contested issues, a surplus of proffered evidence, and tremendous expenditure of
material and human resources.47 Judicial case management minimizes
the expenditure of resources while preparing the case for a fair trial that
will yield a just result.

45. See infra notes 79-107 and accompanying text.
46. ILLINOIS MANUAL, supra note 36, at 11-14, 17-20, 22-27, 168 (discussing the
benefits of having judges in complex litigation cases adopt a managerial approach); see
NATIONAL MASS TORT CONFERENCE, MANAGING MASS TORT CASES: A RESOURCE AND

17 (discussion draft 1995) ("A high
percentage of judges and lawyers strongly endorse the need for and value of judges being
managerial in these cases,").
47. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., supra note 1, at 63-65.
REFERENCE BOOK FOR STATE TRIAL COURT JUDGES
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Active judicial case management, however, does present some risks
to impartiality that do not exist with a more passive judicial role.48
These risks are most acute if the judge takes an active managing role in
attempting to fashion a settlement. 49 Nevertheless, careful observance
of judicial standards will prevent both the existence and the appearance
of impropriety.' °
Management, of course, is not an end in itselft"-it is a means to the
just and efficient resolution of the large cases created by consolidation
of individual claims.52 The advantages of consolidation are twofold:
efficiency and consistency. Consolidated proceedings promote efficiency because they allow evidence and argument to be heard only
once. Triers of fact in more than one location need not hear and decide the same matters. As Professor Zecharia Chafee emphasized half
a century ago, "In matters of justice, . . . the benefactor ... makes
one lawsuit grow where two grew before. 54 A consolidated proceeding will also promote consistent results in similar cases for the simple
reason that the consolidated proceeding has a single result.55 Conversely, multiple decision-makers may diverge in their results in identical cases. Consistency is sometimes thought of as the very essence
of fairness: 56 treating those who are alike the same way.
48. See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 424-31 (1982).
49. See infra text accompanying notes 91-101.
50. See Robert F. Peckham, A Judicial Response to the Cost of Litigation: Case
Management, Two-Stage Discovery Planning and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 37
RUTGERS L. REV. 253, 260-61 (1985) (emphasizing the importance of conducting proceedings on the record).
51. FEDERAL MANUAL 3D, supra note 35, §10.1, at 3.
52. Id. §10.1, at 3-4.
53. For a more extended discussion of this issue, see Weber, supra note 6, at 253-55.
54. ZECHARIAH H. CHAFEE, JR., SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 149 (1950). The same impetus underlies the broad joinder provisions found in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 18-24; see also Mosley v. General Motors Corp., 497
F.2d 1330, 1332-33 (8th Cir. 1974) (discussing purposes of broad joinder rules, which
are similar to those found in the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
ch. 735, §§ 5/2-404 to 5/2-413 (West 1992)). Those who question the utility of consolidation do so on the grounds that it diminishes litigant autonomy and may reduce fairness to the individual. See generally Edward F. Sherman, Aggregate Disposition of
Related Cases: The Policy Issues, 10 REV. LITIG. 231, 236-68 (1991) (discussing
arguments for and against consolidated treatment of cases).
55. Weber, supra note 6, at 253-54 (discussing the benefits of more uniform results
achieved by case consolidation).
56. See PLATO, THE LAWS 229-30 (Trevor J. Saunders ed., 1975) (discussing the idea
of equality). Of course, the position in the text should not be overdrawn. If a consolidated proceeding imposes uniform rules of liability that are insensitive to federalism interests, the consistency is inappropriate. Robert A. Sedler & Aaron Twerski, State
Choice of Law in Mass Tort Cases: A Response to "A View from the Legislature," 73
MARQ. L. REV. 625, 630-32 (1990). In addition, a consolidated proceeding that im-
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B. The Methods of Case Management in Illinois
Case management occurs throughout the litigation. At each stage in
the case, it has several components. The principal stages of a complex
case in which specific management steps are desirable include the early
organizational phase, the discovery phase, settlement facilitation, and
trial." The recommendations of the Committee on Complex Litigation
and the Regional Seminar address each of these aspects of the complex
civil case.58
1. Early Organizational Steps
In the early organizational phase, effective management entails three
steps: assignment of the matter to a single judge, the judge's holding
of a series of conferences with the lawyers in the case, and the entry of
a pretrial order. First, a single judge should be assigned to all aspects
of a complex case. 9 A single judge has the opportunity and incentive
to plan the conduct of the pretrial and trial proceedings, 6° searching for
ways to enhance fairness and efficiency. 6'
There are essentially two methods for choosing the judge: random
selection and selection based upon experience or expertise.62 Random
selection has the benefit of providing the appearance of fairness.63 On
the other hand, selection on the basis of experience or expertise in64
creases the likelihood of a fair result at a minimum of judicial time.
A judge handling one case that is related to several others may have
acquired expertise about the controversy as a whole. The chief judge
can take advantage of this experience by consolidating the related cases
before that judge.65 A judge should deny any petition for change of
poses an erroneous decision of fact or law on a large number of litigants is worse than a
few bad decisions from various adjudicators in individual cases.
57. See infra notes 59-107 and accompanying text.
58. For a more complete discussion of the issues presented in this section, see
ILLINOIS MANUAL, supra note 36, at Chapter 2 (Preliminary Problems); Chapter 3
(Pretrial Procedures); Chapter 4 (Discovery); Chapter 6 (Settlement); Chapter 7 (Trial).
59. ILLINOIS MANUAL, supra note 36, at 17.
60. Id.; FEDERAL MANUAL 2D, supra note 35, § 20.12, at 7-10.
6 1. ILLINOIS MANUAL, supra note 36, at 17; NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS,
JUSTICE DELAYED 72 (1978).
62. ILLINOIS MANUAL, supra note 36, at 17.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.; see ILL. COMP. ST. ANN. ch. 735, § 5/2-1006 (West 1992); see also Peck v.
Peck, 157 N.E.2d 249, 254-55 (Il. 1959) (stating that a court may grant consolidation
even though one trial has already commenced, as long as the court finds that it is convenient and reasonable to do so, and that no substantial rights have been prejudiced by the
consolidation).
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venue that comes after trial or hearing begins, or after the judge "has
ruled on any substantial issue in the case," in order to ensure that the
chief judge can exercise his or her power of consolidation.'
Second, a judge should convene an early conference with the attorneys in the case. 67 The main goal of the conference should be to develop a plan for adjudication of the case. 68 A written agenda for the
conference facilitates progress on the plan. 69 The agenda may include
recusal or disqualification of the judge; coordination of related litigation in other courts; handling of later filings ("tag-along actions");
designation of lead or trial counsel or committees and compensation arrangements for them; scheduling of pretrial matters and trial;70 identification of contested issues; management of discovery; maintenance of a
master file; filing of written status reports; and scheduling of subsequent conferences. 7'
Third, the judge should issue a detailed order based on the conference.72 The order should provide for additional conferences leading
up to the trial.73 In the order or another early order, the judge should
establish a firm trial date, and indicate to the parties the last date for
75
dispositive pretrial motions. 74 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 191(a)
permits the court to set the last date for the filing of dispositive motions, including motions for summary judgment under section 2-1005
of the Code of Civil Procedure 76 and motions for involuntary dismissal
66. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 735, § 5/2-1001.5(c) (West Supp. 1996). Of course,
an exception exists for petitions based on grounds that did not occur until after that
time. Id. Section 2-1001.5(0 of the Code of Civil Procedure might be interpreted to
permit judges to impose reasonable time limits on the exercise of the right to a change
of venue. Id. § 5/2-1001.5(f) ('The order for a change of venue may be made subject to
such equitable terms and conditions as safety to the rights of the parties may seem to require, and the court in its discretion may prescribe.").
67. ILLINOIS MANUAL, supra note 36, at 22; FEDERAL MANUAL 2D, supra note 35, §
21.21, at 29-30, § 21.24, at 31-33; see ILL. SUP. CT. R. 218(a).
68. ILLINOIS MANUAL, supra note 36, at 22; FEDERAL MANUAL 2D, supra note 35,
§21.24, at 31-33.
69. ILLINOIS MANUAL, supra note 36, at 22.
70. See ILL. SUP. CT. R. 218(c).
7 1. ILLINOIS MANUAL, supra note 36, at 23.
72. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 218(b).
73. ILLINOIS MANUAL, supra note 36, at 24-25. Telephone conferences might substitute for in-person meetings, however. See ILL. Sup. CT. R. 185. Regular dates and times
minimize the possibility of scheduling conflicts. ILLINOIS MANUAL, supra note 36, at
24-25. "Judges should not tolerate failure to attend a conference or disobedience of a
scheduling order or other pretrial order." Id. at 25; ILL. SuP. CT. R. 218(d).
74. ILLINOIS MANUAL, supra note 36, at 25-26.
75. ILL. Sup. CT. R. 191(a).
76. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 735, § 5/2-1005 (West 1992).
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under section 2-619. 7' A firm and credible trial date encourages the
lawyers to do the necessary trial preparation, and is the single most effective tool to promote settlement.78
When the complex litigation consists of consolidated actions or
other multiple actions assigned to a single judge, the order should
designate a lead file and provide that any pleading filed in that case is
considered filed in all the other cases within the designation. This step
keeps the parties from having to file identical papers in various related
cases.
2. Management of Discovery
In the discovery phase of a complex case, effective management requires judicial involvement in the interrogatory, document discovery,
and deposition phases of discovery.79 Special judicial concern must be
shown regarding discovery from expert witnesses.80
a. Creationof MasterInterrogatories
A master set of interrogatories is useful in consolidated cases or
those in which there are multiple tag-along actions. In those cases, the
court should require counsel to develop a set of interrogatories that can
be used in each action. 8 1 Among the questions most likely to be included are names and addresses of persons with information, the existence and location of documents and product information, and basic information about injuries and treatment.8 2
b. Management of Document Discovery
Establishment of a document depository spares the court clerk and
the individual lawyers the burden of holding discovery documents.8 3
Often, the parties will agree to arrangements on their own. If the par77. Id. § 5/2-619.
78. See FEDERAL MANUAL 3D, supra note 35, § 23.13, at 168; NATIONAL CENTER FOR
STATE COURTS, supra note 61, at 76; see also Sandra M. Moss, A Response to Judicial
Federalism: A Proposal to Amend the Multidistrict Litigation Statute From a State
Judge's Perspective, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1573, 1579 (1995) (noting that the setting of realistic trial dates can help resolve litigation).
79. See ILLINOIS MANUAL, supra note 36, at 33. See generally Schwarzer, supra note
I1 (proposing procedures for efficient discovery in both the state and federal forum).
80. ILLINOIS MANUAL, supra note 36, at 48-50.
81. Id. at 33-35.
82. Id. at 34-35.
83. See, e.g., N. Robert Stoll, Litigating and Managing a Mass Disaster Case: An
Oregon Plaintiff Lawyer's Experience in the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Litigation, 56 OR.
ST. B. BULL. 14, 17 (Oct. 1995) (noting the effective use of a document depository for
discovery and pleadings by the plaintiffs' lawyers in the Exxon Valdez case).
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ties cannot agree, the court needs to compel them to make arrangements. Large accounting firms are eager to perform the work. Document depositories not only make the pretrial proceedings work more
smoothly, they can also be used to facilitate individual trials of previously consolidated cases." The judge may require the parties to file at
the depository all the exhibits that they plan to use at each trial, identified by the document number assigned when filed with the depository,
and to serve a list of the trial exhibits on the other parties in the case.85
Each case can then have the benefit of the organizational work with the
papers in a single case.
c. Depositions
Illinois courts have introduced a number of innovations into deposition practice in complex cases. Some courts have imposed multiple
deposition "tracks," in which parties are required to depose specified
numbers of different categories of witnesses per week until all depositions are completed.86 This step keeps discovery on schedule and
keeps the parties from inventing excuses for failing to produce deponents. Judges have limited the repeated deposition of the same witness
by ordering that new parties filing tag-along actions be allowed to join
the suit only if they agree not to depose the same witnesses on issues
covered in previous depositions.87
Putting a discovery committee in place is a crucial step towards
making discovery manageable, and takes on critical importance in
keeping deposition practice within reasonable bounds. A discovery
committee consists of selected plaintiffs' and defendants' counsel who
will take the lead in conducting and defending discovery for all parties
with similar interests. The court's order establishing the committee
should provide that during the deposition the inquiries and objections
of one counsel must stand for all parties covered by the order.
d. Discoveryfrom Experts
Initiating expert opinion discovery before information from occurrence witnesses is in place may be inefficient. 88 The occurrence witnesses' statements may affect the experts' opinions. Thus, the judge
84. ILLINOIS MANUAL, supra note 36, at 39.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 43. See also Stoll, supra note 83, at 17 (reporting on the use of multiple
track depositions in the Exxon Valdez case).
87. ILLINOIS MANUAL, supra note 36, at 44. See infra note 89 and accompanying text,
discussing limiting expert witnesses to the scope of their previous testimony.
88. ILLINOIS MANUAL, supra note 36, at 48.
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may choose to delay expert opinion discovery until the occurrence witnesses have been deposed. This does not prevent the court from establishing a schedule of expert discovery. Although experts often have
extremely demanding schedules, if information on availability is provided with identification of the expert, the parties can more easily plan
their discovery programs.
A judge may also promote economy and speed by ordering expert
witnesses bound by statements made in previous depositions and trials. The court may then restrict further questioning to matters not covered in the previous litigation. Parties may also agree that experts'
evidence depositions be admitted regardless of the availability of the
deponent. Such a step allows for more flexible trial scheduling and
conserves the parties' costs. This procedure currently exists by rule
for physicians.8 9
In cases with many parties, there is a high likelihood that some parties will try to rely on co-parties' experts. A party who intends to rely
on another party's expert must be aware of the risk that the other party
will settle before trial and should be encouraged to make fallback arrangements and undertake necessary disclosures to the other parties. 90
3. Settlement
Settlement negotiations may take place at any time during a complex
case, and judges who manage complex litigation effectively take full
advantage of pretrial conferences devoted to settlement. 91 Some
judges conduct separate conferences with the plaintiffs and the defendants. Although the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct 92 and
Code of Judicial Conduct93 forbid ex parte contact on the merits of a
case, exceptions exist when the conduct is in the course of official proceedings or otherwise authorized by law. Still, both the risk of prejudice and the appearance of propriety demand that the judge not undertake ex parte conferences without the consent of l6oth parties.94 The
greatest danger of prejudice exists when the case will conclude with a
89. ILL. Sup. CT. R. 212(b). A proposed amendment is pending that would implement
the change suggested in the text.
90. ILLINOIS MANUAL, supra note 36, at 48-49. A court has barred expert testimony in
an instance in which the nonsettling party failed to make disclosure. Renfro v. Allied
Indus. Equip. Corp., 507 N.E.2d 1213, 1232 (III. App. 5th Dist. 1987) (finding no abuse
of discretion).
91. ILLINOIS MANUAL, supra note 36, at 701-71; FEDERAL MANUAL 3D, supra note 35,
§ 23.11, at 166-67.
92. ILLINOIS RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.5(i).
93. ILL. Sup. CT. R. 63(A)(4).
94. ILLINOIS MANUAL, supra note 36, at 75.
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bench 96trial.95 A solution is to have another judge conduct the conferences.

Going beyond the settlement conference, some courts have found
success facilitating settlement by encouraging the parties to use mediation, arbitration (especially in cases where individual claims are of
modest amount), and summary jury trials.97 In the summary jury trial,
the parties make capsule presentations of their cases either to a neutral
individual or to a jury, obtaining a nonbinding decision. 98 This procedure gives the parties a neutral, authentic prediction of trial results, and
consumes little judicial time. 9
A firm, credible trial date also promotes settlement, for only the
prospect of trial forces the parties to do the work necessary to predict
trial outcomes accurately.' 00 Consolidation and severance orders
might be needed to establish a firm trial date. In cases consolidated for
pretrial proceedings that nonetheless require separate trials, judges can
schedule early trial dates for one or more cases representative of others. This step promotes settlement by giving the parties accurate forecasts of results in their own cases.' 0
4. Trial
In trying a complex case, the judge must take a number of steps to
keep the expenditure of time and other resources from spiraling out of
control. These trial management techniques cover handling of the
jury, dealing with counsel, and arranging adequate facilities.

95. See Hubert Will, The Role of the Judge in the Settlement Process, 75 F.R.D. 203,
211-12 (1976). Some judges believe that ex parte conferences should never be undertaken in a nonjury case, even with the parties' consent. Id.
96. Resnik, supra note 48, at 435. Professor Resnik suggests that a judge should
handle the formal adjudication while another assumes responsibility for mediation and
settlement negotiations. Id.
97. ILLINOIS MANUAL, supra note 36, at 76-77.
98. Id. at 77.
99. Id. The court compelled attendance and participation in a nonbinding summary
jury trial in Federal Reserve Bank v. Carey-Canada, Inc., 123 F.R.D. 603 (D. Minn.
1988). Contra Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 854 F.2d 900 (6th Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033 (1989). See generally Thomas Lambros, Report to
the Judicial Conference of the United States, 103 F.R.D. 461, 461-98 (1984) (discussing
various alternative methods of dispute resolution); Andrew Sykes, Note, Cincinnati Gas
& Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co.: Extinguishing the Light on Summary Jury Trials, 49
OHIO ST. L.J. 1453 (1989).
100. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 61, at 76 (surveying state
courts).
101. See FEDERAL MANUAL 2D, supra note 35, § 23.12, at 162-64.
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Complex cases that may involve lengthy trials require special techniques for selecting jurors. 102 The judge should devote special attention to the jury questionnaires, in order to ferret out prejudices or
conflicts of interest. In any trials that could become lengthy, alternate
jurors should be impanelled. 0 3 The judge should do everything possible to make the case less taxing and more comprehensible to the jury,
and should make sure that the jury knows of the judge's efforts.
Note-taking by jurors enhances memory and understanding, and must
be permitted under Illinois law.'0 4 One Illinois judge has permitted jurors to present questions to witnesses during the trial.'0 5 Jurors' comprehension of facts and issues may be improved if they are allowed to
do so.
In cases involving many parties, the court should appoint lead counsel, or enter an order that objections for one party will stand for objections for all the parties on a given side. 10 6 Typically, the parties on a
side will make their own agreements on which counsel will serve as
lead for which part of the case, and which parts of the case should be
handled individually. The court should encourage these voluntary arrangements.
Finally, from the most practical perspective, cases with many parties
may require larger rooms than those in the courthouses of many
Illinois communities. If the parties agree to pay a share of the cost,
private facilities may work out best.'O°

102. ILLINOIS MANUAL, supra note 36, at 84-86.
103. Id. at 84. The provision governing preemptory challenges to alternate jurors
appears to restrict the number of alternates to "I or 2." ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 735, §
5/2-1106(b) (West 1992). The parties, however, may stipulate to seat additional alternate jurors. Id. The court may also encourage the parties to stipulate to the decision of
the case by fewer than 12 jurors if the number of alternates is inadequate. See id.
104. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 705 § 315/1(b) (West Supp. 1996). A court has held
that jurors' statutory right to take notes exists in criminal cases, see ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. ch. 725, § 5/115-4(n) (West 1992), and cannot be waived by an agreement of the
parties that the jurors not take notes. People v. Layhew, 548 N.E.2d 25 (Ill. App. 5th
Dist. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 564 N.E.2d 1232 (I11.
1990).
105. Warren Wolfson, An Experiment in Juror Interrogation of Witnesses, CBA
REC., Feb. 1987, at 12 (regarding use of procedure by consent).
106. ILLINOIS MANUAL, supra note 36, at 89.
107. Consent is the operative concept. A court has reversed an award of costs
payable to a company that built a courthouse annex for exhibit storage. Kemner v.
Monsanto Co., 576 N.E.2d 1146, 1164 (Ii. App. 5th Dist.), appeal denied, 584 N.E.2d
130 (I11.
1991).
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V. EMERGING ISSUES IN COMPLEX LITIGATION
MANAGEMENT IN ILLINOIS

Despite the consensus in favor of the management approach outlined
above, a number of issues important for the judicial management of
complex cases in Illinois remain unresolved. These emerging issues
include coordination of Illinois cases with parallel federal and other
state proceedings, deferral to proceedings in other states, issue separation at trial, and further development of class action procedures.' 0 8
While the issues that have already been dealt with by the Illinois courts
and the committees are largely matters of logistics and sound
practice,' 0 9 the matters that loom in the future center around legal
doctrines. Some of the issues may elude a reasonable resolution
unless existing legal doctrines are modified, or new rules or statutes
adopted.
A. Coordinationof Federaland State Proceedings
One potentially important step in conducting complex litigation is the
coordination of discovery with parallel proceedings in the federal
courts or the courts of other states."' Coordination of discovery is a
source of economy for both the Illinois and the parallel proceeding. If
the deposition of an expert may be taken only once for use in several
cases,"' the litigants have saved dollars, the expert has saved time,
and all of the cases are advanced. Not surprisingly, federal-state discovery coordination is the subject of a leading proposal for efficient
2
management of complex litigation."1
Illinois law presents some challenges to coordinated discovery, but
the challenges can be surmounted with a modicum of cooperation from
the parties. Nothing in Illinois law prohibits the parties from stipulating to use depositions in multiple forums." 3 The problem is that the
108. The Illinois Manual for Complex Litigation contains extensive discussion of
these various issues. See ILLINOIS MANUAL, supra note 36, at Chapter 7 (Trial, discussing
issue separation); Chapter 9 (Special Problem-Class Action Cases); Chapter 10

(Special Problem-Mass Tort Cases); Chapter 12 (Special Problem-Cases with Parallel
Proceedings in Other States); Chapter 13 (Special Problem-Cases with Parallel Federal
Proceedings).

109. See supra part III for a discussion of the response of Illinois courts to complex
litigation.

I 10.

See FEDERAL MANUAL 3D, supra note 35, § 33.23, at 315-17.

111. See supra part IV.B.2.d.
112. Schwarzer, supra note 11; see Moss, supra note 78; Paul D. Rheingold,
Comments on Judicial Federalism: A Proposal to Amend the Multidistrict Litigation
Statute, 73 TEx. L. REV. 1581 (1995).
113.

ILLINOIS MANUAL, supra note 36, at 150-51.
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parties may wish to employ different questioning strategies in Illinois
discovery depositions, whose main use at trial is impeachment, than in
federal or other states' depositions, which have a wider range of trial
use. Parties may also stipulate to be bound in one case by discovery
orders in another case, but there may be strategic reasons for one or
another side to refuse to do so." 4 Document discovery would appear
to be a fertile ground for stipulated coordination, although the parties
need to be aware of distinctions between the Illinois and federal workproduct doctrines."5

The new discovery rules promulgated by the Illinois Supreme Court
and the recently revised Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have converged in ways that should make each system less foreign to those
familiar with the other. Both the federal and state rules now provide
for exclusion of evidence as one of the sanctions for failure to make a
timely disclosure. 16 Both now require meetings to attempt to resolve
differences between parties before one may approach the court with a
discovery motion." 7
Illinois judges are free to contact their counterparts assigned to the
parallel proceedings in the federal system or in other states. The Illinois judge must simply exercise caution not to delegate any authority
over the case to someone other than a duly appointed judicial officer of
the State of Illinois." 8 A common step that may facilitate judicial
economy is for the Illinois judge and the judge in the parallel proceeding to designate the same individuals as lead discovery and liaison
counsel in each case, so that the discovery committees coincide. If the
114. Id. at 151.
115. Compare Consolidation Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 432 N.E.2d 250 (Iil.
1982) (interpreting Illinois attorney work-product privilege) and ILL. SuP. CT. R.
201(b)(2) (establishing Illinois privilege and work product) with Upjohn Co. v. United
States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981) (interpreting federal privilege and work product) and FED.
R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) (establishing federal privilege and work product). In brief, the protection in Illinois is both narrower and stronger than that in the federal system. The

doctrine protects only materials made by or for a party in preparation for trial that contain or disclose theories, mental impression, or litigation plans. ILL. SuP. CT. R.
201 (b)(2). Other materials are available without a special good cause showing. Monier
vi Chamberlain, 221 N.E.2d 410, 417 (Ill. 1966). Materials covered by the protection
are all. but immune from disclosure. Consolidation Coal Co., 432 N.E.2d at 253
(holding that the party seeking disclosure must "conclusively demonstrate the absolute
impossibility of securing similar information from other sources"). The federal standard
covers.a broader range of materials made in preparation for litigation, but allows disclosure upon a weaker showing. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
116. Compare ILL. SUP. CT. R. 219(c)(iv) with FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(B).
1 17. Compare ILL. Sup. Cr. R. 201(k) with FED. R. Civ. P. 37(A)(2).
118. ILLINOIS MANUAL, supra note 36, at 151 n.1; see Bernier v. Burris, 497 N.E.2d
763, 769-71 (Ill. 1986).
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persons conducting discovery in both cases are the same, they will
know when duplication is taking place and be in a position to avoid it.
B. Deferralto Proceedingsin Other States
There are some cases in which the Illinois courts may realize that
consolidation of the case into ongoing litigation in another state would
be the most desirable manner to conduct the entire proceeding. The
cases in the other state might be farther along, or the other state might
be one in which the joinder of more of the relevant parties is possible.
The other state might be the location of more of the parties or important
witnesses.
Courts should expand the doctrines of abatement of proceedings in
favor of prior pending actions and dismissal on the basis of forum non
conveniens, and use these doctrines to induce parties to join their suits
into ongoing litigation in other states. " 9 Illinois law now provides that
a court may dismiss an action on the ground that there is a prior pending action between the same parties on the same cause of action. '1 It
is a worthwhile extension of this authority to include dismissed when a
case exists elsewhere against the same defendant and the plaintiff can
without injustice join the proceeding.
Similarly, forum non conveniens doctrine could be used to dismiss
actions when there is an action elsewhere in the United States that the
plaintiff could conveniently join. New York law makes the existence
of litigation that could be joined a relevant factor in a forum non
conveniens dismissal. 2 ' Illinois might be well advised to emulate this
development.
A more formal solution to the problem of duplicative cases pending
in multiple jurisdictions, and one that might stimulate encouraging reciprocal developments elsewhere, would be for Illinois to adopt the
Uniform Transfer of Litigation Act, drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. 22 Under this proposal, transfer of all or part of a case to another state's courts would be
permitted with the consent of the transferring and receiving court
whenever transfer serves the fair administration of justice and the convenience of parties and witnesses.1 23 Solutions to duplicative litigation
119. This position is explained at greater length in Weber, supra note 6, at 267-68.
120.
121.

ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 735, § 5/2-619(a)(3) (West 1992).
N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 327(a) (McKinney 1983).

122. 14 U.L.A. § 78 (Supp. 1992). South Dakota has enacted the bill already, but
larger states have not acted on it. S.D. H.B. 1337 (enacted March 13, 1992).
123. 14 U.L.A. § 104 (Supp. 1992).
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would still depend on voluntary action by judges, but the mechanism
for formal transfer would at least be in place.1 24
C. Issue Separationat Trial
Most authorities on complex litigation argue that some categories of
complex cases can best be managed if broken down for trial. 121 In
particular, separating issues such as general causation in product defect
cases or negligence in environmental cases enables the trier of fact to
focus on a single dispute. The shortened trial may then lead to dismissal of the case or a prompt settlement. 126
Most trial lawyers, however, and certainly most plaintiffs' lawyers,
believe that separation of liability from damages affects the outcome of
a tort case, 127 and empirical studies support their belief.128 Separation
prevents the compromise verdict, in which the jury cannot agree on liability, and splits the difference by reducing the damages award. 129 It
also prevents plaintiffs' verdicts in cases in which the jury does not
really believe that liability exists but gives a modest award because of
sympathy or residual doubt. 30 Under conventional legal analysis,
compromise and sympathy verdicts are not proper, and if issue separation eliminates them as a side-effect, that is all to the good.' 3'
The contrary position, however, argues that unless evidence of
damages is presented at the same time as evidence relating to issues of
liability, the case is presented in a sterile, unrealistic way. 32 Thus, the
outcome effects of issue separation are not only real, they are bad.
124. See generally Edward H. Cooper, Interstate Consolidation: A Comparison of
the ALI Project with the Uniform Transfer of Litigation Act, 54 LA. L. REV. 897 (1994)
(discussing the Act).
125. E.g., AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 5, at 624-29; FEDERAL MANUAL 3D,
supra note 35, § 21.63, at 118-21; NATIONAL MASS TORT CONFERENCE, supra note 46, at
72-73; Joseph Sanders, From Science to Evidence: The Testimony on Causation in the
Bendectin Cases, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1, 75 (1993). A recent, exhaustive study of the issue
proposes that separation of the general causation issue be undertaken in mass tort cases
only when the imposition of liability could lead to destruction of an entire industry or
comparable social harms. James A. Henderson et al., Optimal Issue Separation in
Modern Products Liability Litigation, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1653 (1995).
126. See sources cited supra note 125.
127. See Jack B. Weinstein, Routine Bifurcation of Jury Negligence Trials: An
Example of Questionable Use of Rule Making Power, 14 VAND. L. REV. 831 (1961).
128. See Henderson et al., supra note 125, at 1679 & nn.134-35 (collecting
empirical studies); see also RICHARD L. MARCUS & EDWARD F. SHERMAN, COMPLEX
LITIGATION 881 (2d ed. 1992) (collecting studies).
129. See Henderson et al., supra note 125, at 1671.
130. See id. at 1692.
131. See Sanders, supra note 125, at 75.
132. See, e.g., Trangsrud, supra note 5, at 81.
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This position is buttressed by the claim that bifurcation was unknown
at common law and that the constitutional right to a jury trial guarantees a jury trial as it was practiced at common law. 33
There are reasons to question the argument that proceeds from the
grounds that bifurcation was an unknown procedure in jury trials at
common law and that jury trial rights cannot be altered from those at
common law. Any procedural reform may have an impact on jury trial
rights. The right to a jury trial has survived as long as it has because
of its plasticity. Thus in the federal system, the right to a jury trial expanded with the merger of law and equity 34
35 and contracted with the
evolution of the collateral estoppel doctrine.
Any doctrine that would allow no adaptation of jury trial rights for
modem procedural innovations invites calcification and impracticality.
Effective bifurcation of civil cases takes place routinely in modem
cases when liability or damages is stipulated or determined by motion 136 or when a case is remanded for trial on limited issues. Special
interrogatories to the jury 137 also have the effect of requiring individual
decisions on subissues pertaining to distinct aspects of liability or
damages. It is doubtful that a contemporary court would reject these
innovations on the ground that they were not a part of jury trials at
common law. Mason v. Dunn,'38 an Illinois Appellate Court case disapproving the bifurcation of the case into liability and damages phases
over the defendant's objection, rests its disapproval upon the ground
that neither the Illinois Supreme Court by rule nor the legislature by
statute has expressly permitted bifurcation, eschewing the constitutional argument and all but inviting high court or legislative intervention. 39

133. See Albert Bedecarre, Rule 42(b) Bifurcation at an Extreme: Polyfurcation of
Liability Issues in Environmental Torts Cases, 17 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 123, 137
(1989).
134. See Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510-11 (1959) (holding
that under merger of law and equity, law issues tried to a jury should be tried first).
135. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 337 (1979) (rejecting claim
of jury trial in application of offensive, nonmutual collateral estoppel, which was
unknown at common law, from a nonjury proceeding).
136. See ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 735, § 5/2-1005(d) (West 1992) (permitting
summary determination of major issues by a court before trial if no genuine issue of material fact exists as to the issues).
137. See id. § 5/2-1108 (permitting the use of special interrogatories on individual
issues in a case).
138. 285 N.E.2d 191 (I11.App. 2d Dist. 1972).
139. Id. at 192-93. The court reasoned further that in other jurisdictions where bifurcated trials are permitted, statutes or court rules allow the practice. Id.
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Nevertheless, a rejection of the practice of issue separation may still
be a better course for the Illinois courts. Separating out issues such as
general causation inevitably transforms proceedings over the injuries
of persons into abstract controversies. In such a sterile trial setting, a
jury may have difficulty appreciating the gravity of its decision for real
individuals. 14 Moreover, courts ought to be cautious about applying a
novel procedural device when the overwhelming evidence indicates
that it will work significant changes in case outcomes.
Practice as to separation of issues should be determined by weighing considerations of fairness and efficiency, not by pointing to historical antecedents. Ultimately, action by the Illinois Supreme Court or
the General Assembly will be needed. Because of the outcome effects
of issue separation, a principled decision that applies to all cases is superior to the discretionary, and therefore unpredictable, approach favored by federal courts on the matter.4
D. Class Action Problems
"Complex litigation" is not coterminous with "class action litigation." Nevertheless, class action cases frequently become protracted,
and may raise issues of factual, procedural, or substantive complexity.1 42 Class action procedure is a formal mechanism to deal with large
numbers of individuals who have similar claims to present to the court.
Class action status may be the least expensive, quickest, and fairest
way to respond to some forms of complex litigation.
Illinois courts, however, will have to resolve difficult problems
when handling proposed class actions. Notice is a vexing issue in
class action cases. 43 The leading United States Supreme Court case
on the issue, PhillipsPetroleum Co. v. Shutts,'44 does not require notice to in-state plaintiff class members, 45 nor does it purport to apply
140. Indeed, some federal courts have gone so far as to bar individuals with disfigurements from courtrooms for fear that their appearance may provoke sympathy from the
jury. This step serves only to divorce the case from the reality of the human being
bringing it. See Trangsrud, supra note 5, at 81. It would also appear to constitute unlawful disability discrimination. See Mark C. Weber, Disability Discrimination by State
and Local Government, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1089 (1995) (discussing prohibitions
against disability discrimination by governmental entities).
141. See In re Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1988) (describing the discretion that federal judges have in determining whether to hold separate trials on different
issues).
142. See FEDERAL MANUAL 3D, supra note 35, § 30, at 211-12.
143. See generally id. § 30.2, at 223-30 (discussing notices from the court and to the
class).
144. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
145. Id. at 806, 808, 814.

1996]

Managing Complex Litigation in the Illinois Courts

981

its discussion of notice to cases for non-monetary relief.'" Although
the Illinois statute on class actions gives the trial court discretion
whether to give individual notice of certification to the class members, 47 nearly all Illinois courts considering the question have ruled
that due process requires notice.'48
Relief in class cases presents issues that are still emerging in Illinois. A problem that has appeared in other states is that the absence of
records or other factors prevent the identification of individuals to
whom relief ought to be given.'49 Some states have devised a "fluid
recovery" or "cy pres" relief solution. 50 In these schemes, money or
other relief is provided to a group of individuals that is identifiable and
that is the nearest group to that which would be entitled to the recovery. 5' Basic principles of remedies acknowledge that relief is not always precise and that persons may benefit from group remedies even

146. Id. at 811-12 (limiting holding to class actions for monetary relief).
147. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 735, §§ 5/2-801 to 2-806 (West 1992).
148. Miner v. Gillette Co., 428 N.E.2d 478, 480-85 (III. 1981) (stressing geographic dispersion of class and other factors), cert. dismissed, 459 U.S. 86 (1982);
Frank v. Teachers Ins. and Annuity Ass'n, 376 N.E.2d 1377, 1379 (III. 1978) (noting
potential conflicts among class members in action to reform 400,000 annuity contracts); Client Follow-Up Co. v. Hynes, 434 N.E.2d 485, 488-91 (Ill. App. 1st Dist.
1982) (citing potential conflicts among class members); Hamer v. Board of Educ., 367
N.E.2d 739, 740-48 (Ill. App. 2d Dist. 1977) (raising questions about representative adequacy). See DeLisa v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 520 N.E.2d 807, 809 (I11.App.
1st Dist. 1987) (allowing intervention when class members were not notified); Fox v.
Northwest Ins. Brokers, Inc., 466 N.E.2d 1260, 1262 (111.App. 1st Dist. 1983) (finding
publication notice of settlement inadequate). Contra People ex rel. Wilcox v. Equity
Funding Life Ins. Co., 335 N.E.2d 448, 453-54 (111. 1975) (finding that notice issue was
not properly raised, but commenting that individual notice is not required in all class actions); Carrao v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 454 N.E.2d 781, 790-91 (i11. App. 1st Dist.
1983) (upholding certification despite argument that individual notice would be impossible); Hoover v. May Dep't Stores Co., 378 N.E.2d 762, 773-74 (I11.App. 5th Dist.
1978) (noting absence of conflicts and small individual amounts in controversy, which
make likelihood of opting out or intervention small), rev'd on other grounds, 395
N.E.2d 541 (III. 1979).
This author has argued elsewhere that if preclusion is imposed on plaintiff class members as to non-monetary claims, due process requires individual notice, but that the court
should not ordinarily enter a judgment that requires preclusion of claims unless the defendant is willing to pay for notice. Mark C. Weber, Preclusion and Procedural Due
Process in Rule 23(b)(2) Class Actions, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 347 (1988).
149. ILLINOIS MANUAL, supra note 36, at 121.
150. Id.; see generally NEWBERG, supra note 3, §§ 13.45-13.47 (discussing various
solutions for relief).
151. See generally NEWBERG, supra note 3, §§ 13.45-13.47 (discussing issues and
collecting state court cases). In an interpleader case, a court ordered a pro-rata distribution of a deficient fund among equally-situated claimants. Hebel v. Ebersole, 543 F.2d
14, 18 (7th Cir. 1976).
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though they were not victims of the defendant's unlawful actions.5 2
The fluid recovery approach
is a modest extension of those principles
53
to class action relief.
Increasingly, plaintiffs in Illinois and elsewhere seek to institute
class action suits in mass tort situations. 54 Class action proceedings
would bring judicial relief to individuals with tort claims similar to
those of others but who have failed to file cases on their own. t55 They
also permit preclusion of those individuals and all others whose cases
are embraced by the final judgment in the case. 56 The class proceeding thus magnifies the ultimate recovery, 57 but assures the defendant
global peace with respect to all those under the court's jurisdiction. 5
152. See, e.g., Sheet Metal Workers, Local 28 v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 471-75
(1986).
153. In other jurisdictions and in the federal courts, judges have had mixed views on
the propriety of fluid recovery in class action suits. Compare State v. Levi Strauss &
Co., 715 P.2d 564 (Cal. 1986); Bebchick v. Public Util. Comm'n, 318 F.2d 187 (D.C.
Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 913 (1963) with Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 739
F.2d 730 (2d Cir. 1984); Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1981).
154. See Mau v. Unarco Indus., Inc., 481 N.E.2d 1207, 1208 (I11.App. 4th Dist.
1985) (noting class action allegations in an asbestos case but not discussing class action status); Handley v. Unarco Indus., Inc., 463 N.E.2d 1011, 1014 (Ill. App. 4th Dist.
1984) (same). See generally FEDERAL MANUAL 3D, supra note 35, § 33.262, at 324-25
(describing the use of class actions within mass tort cases); John H. Coffee, Jr., Class
Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343 (1995)
(discussing the use of classes of future victims in mass tort class actions).
155. The unfiled claims might be those of lesser value. See David Rosenberg, Class
Actions for Mass Torts: Doing Justice by Collective Means, 62 IND. L.J. 561, 572
(1987) (discussing effects of class proceedings on mass tort litigation). A class action
proceeding is an effective means of making those claims economical to litigate. See id.
156. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 44-46 (1940) (finding preclusive effect of
Illinois class action judgment to violate due process when class member's interest was
adverse to that of representative).
157. See Rosenberg, supra note 155, at 573 (discussing enhanced incentives to increased care on the part of potential defendants). In In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51
F.3d 1293 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 184 (1995), the court granted mandamus to
decertify a federal class action involving infection from contaminated blood products,
noting among other things that the magnification of damages caused by the class nature
of the proceeding placed intense pressure on the defendant to settle, rather than risk
bankruptcy from a verdict that covered the entire class. Id. at 1297 (discussing appropriateness of federal mandamus). It should be noted, however, that defendants have frequently prevailed in large-scale consolidated proceedings. Eg., In re Bendectin Litig.,
857 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1006 (1989); In re Salmonella
Litig., 556 N.E.2d 593 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 1990), a fact that may induce the defendants
to resist inappropriate settlement demands. Moreover, selection of issues for class
treatment might be made so as to avoid conclusive class treatment of those in which disparate results would be likely were the cases handled separately. See infra text accompanying notes 159-65 (discussing class actions on individual issues under Illinois law).
158. This feature is a commonly cited benefit of settlement classes, those certified as
part of a comprehensive settlement for all victims of a defective product or mass disaster. E.g., In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 752 (4th Cir.) (approving the use of set-
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Common issues that might support class action status for these cases
would be the existence of a defect in a widely marketed product, 5 9 the
negligence of the defendant whose premises were the site of a mass
disaster, or the possibility that a medicine or other product could have
caused harm."
Opponents of class certification in mass torts typically contend that
the common issues in mass tort cases do not predominate over individual issues. 16' They also argue that unlike consumer cases, 162 individual claims in a mass tort are significant enough to merit the services
of an attorney without the use of a class action. Although class actions
might be the most efficient manner in which to do justice for large
numbers of injured persons and achieve a final, global resolution of a
mass tort, a formidable benefit exists to having one's own lawyer
rather than the lawyer for the entire class. 163 Members of a class have
much less formal control over litigation decisions than do plaintiffs in
individual cases.164
A possible compromise in cases of this type is to have the case proceed as a class with regard to only a few common issues. Illinois law

tlement classes), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 959 (1989).
159. See In re Salmonella Litig., No. 85 L 0000 (I11.Cir. Ct. Cook County Aug. 1,
1985), aff'd as to subsequent proceedings, 556 N.E.2d 593 (I11.App. 1st Dist. 1990).
160. See Salmonella, 556 N.E.2d at 593 (decision denying punitive damages in class
action in which liability to class was stipulated); see also Purcell & Wardrope v. Hertz
Corp., 530 N.E.2d 994, 997-1001 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 1988) (reversing denial of class
certification in deposit overcharge case because of common issues pertaining to liability, despite necessity for some individual determinations). See generally Thomas W.
Henderson & Tybe A. Brett, Class Actions and Consolidations in Mass Toxic Tort
Cases, in MANAGING COMPLEX LITIGATION: PROCEDURES AND STRATEGIES FOR LAWYERS
AND COURTS (American Bar Ass'n Torts & Ins. Practice Section ed. 1991) (discussing
toxic tort cases' conformance to comparable federal class action standards).
161. See Morrissy v. Eli Lilly & Co., 394 N.E.2d 1369, 1376 (111. App. Ist Dist.
1979). It could be that judicial attitudes against class actions in mass torts are less a
matter of the standards for granting class action status than concerns over manageability
and fairness to the opposing party. See Marjorie H. Mintzer & Yasmin Daley-Duncan,
Class Actions: A Disfavored Management Tool for Mass Tort Litigation, in MANAGING
COMPLEX LITIGATION: PROCEDURES AND STRATEGIES FOR LAWYERS AND COURTS (American
Bar Ass'n Torts & Ins. Practice Section ed. 1991).
162. See Miner v. Gillette Co., 428 N.E.2d 478, 484 (II1. 1981) (discussing the impracticality of prosecuting small, individual consumer fraud claims), cert. dismissed,
459 U.S. 86 (1982).
163. See Trangsrud, supra note 5, at 74-76 (discussing the benefits of autonomy in
litigation of tort cases). But see Deborah R. Hensler, Resolving Mass Toxic Torts:
Myths and Realities, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 89, 95-97 (questioning the autonomy of litigants in typical, non-class tort litigation).
164. See Yandle v. PPG Indus., Inc., 65 F.R.D. 566 (E.D. Tex. 1974) (noting lesser
autonomy on part of class member); Coffee, supra note 154, at 1346.
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permits this procedure. 16' Effectively, the class action would be used
as a substitute for partial consolidation under Illinois Supreme Court
Rule 384. The partial class action might also be used as a management
device for pretrial proceedings in consolidated cases in which the
problems among attorneys for individual plaintiffs are insoluble. In a
class action, the class representative is entrusted with all the litigation
decisions. Certifying a class as to only a few issues would achieve
some gains of judicial economy while still preserving the autonomy of
plaintiffs on other aspects of their cases. The individual cases might
still be handled in a consolidated fashion for pretrial or trial proceedings on other issues, as appropriate.
VI. CONCLUSION
A judge assigned to a complex case in Illinois has the means to
manage the case effectively. By using these means, the judge can
achieve the goal of justice for the parties while conserving the resources of the litigants and the judicial system. Illinois law permits
recognized management techniques to be employed in the judge's effort. Nevertheless, the state reviewing courts and the Illinois General
Assembly will ultimately have to play a role in resolving doctrinal
problems that might otherwise present an obstacle to full achievement
of justice and efficiency in complex cases.

165. See ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 735, § 5/2-802(b) (West 1992). Federal courts
construing a provision of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that requires predominance of common issues have differed about the appropriateness of using class actions
in mass tort cases. Compare Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649, 665-67
(E.D. Tex. 1990) (approving class) with Causey v. Pan Am. World Airways, 66 F.R.D.
392, 399 (E.D. Va. 1975) (rejecting class). See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)
(permitting class actions when common questions of law or fact predominate over individual questions); NEWBERG, supra note 3, § 17.06 (listing mass tort cases approving
and rejecting class actions).

